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Abstract—We present a new type of clogging DoS attacks, with
the highest amplification factors achieved by off-path attackers,
using only puppets, i.e., sandboxed malware on victim machines.
Specifically, we present off-path variants of the Opt-ack, Ack-
storm and Coremelt DoS attacks, achieving results comparable
to these achieved previously achieved by eavesdropping/MitM
attackers and (unrestricted) malware. In contrast to previous
off-path attacks, which attacked the client (machine) running the
malware, our attacks address a very different goal: large-scale
clogging DoS of a third party, or even of backbone connections.
Our clogging attacks are based on off-path TCP injections.
Indeed, as an additional contribution, we present improved
off-path TCP injection attacks. Our new attacks significantly
relax the requirements cf. to the known attacks; specifically,
our injection attack requires only a Java script in browser
sandbox (not ‘restricted malware’), does not depend on specific
operating system properties, and is efficient even when client’s
port is determined using recommended algorithm. Our attacks
are constructed modularly, allowing reuse of modules for other
scenarios and replacing modules as necessary. We present specific
defenses, however, this work is further proof to the need to base
security on sound foundations, using cryptography to provide
security even against MitM attackers.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the importance of the Internet grows, there is higher risk
in disruption of its services, i.e., perform Denial/degradation
of Service (DoS) attacks; already we see DoS attacks becoming
a significant concern, with different motivations, including
criminal, ideological (‘hacktivism’) and even as part of cy-
berwarfare. We focus on DoS attacks which are based on
network clogging, i.e., disrupting network services by causing
excessive traffic; these attacks do not depend on vulnerabilities
of the victim network or application. Network clogging DoS
attacks are becoming larger and more common, and becoming
a significant concern to corporations and even governments.
Recent reports indicate attack rates in the order of 100
Gbps[5]; 60-86.5% of the attacks targeted the infrastructure
(layer 3), including the mitigation infrastructure itself[15],
which is mostly based on providing overcapacity upon attack.
All clogging attacks are based on sending information from
many malicious agents; such agents are normally malware run-
ning on user machines, ranging from fully-privileged malware
to limited-privileges malware (e.g., Android application) and
to puppet, i.e., malware running within standard sandbox (such
as script or applet). It is easier for attackers to collect puppets
which are malicious scripts running in a browser’s sandbox
[4], these only require users accessing the attacker website.
In this paper, we show that even such mere puppets can be
abused to launch devastating clogging DoS attacks. The attacks
we present exploit behaviors of the Transmission Control Pro-
tocol (TCP), or more precisely, exploit puppets running TCP
on different client machines, to cause huge amounts of traffic
leading to congestion. TCP is the main transport protocol
over the Internet, ensuring reliable communication between
applications; in particular, puppets are usually restricted to
communication using standard TCP stacks, except possibly for
communication to the site sending the malware. This makes
it challenging to use puppets for clogging attacks, since TCP
responds gracefully to congestion to ensure fair and efficient
sharing of network resources.
Trivially, a MitM attacker can eavesdrop, block, modify
and inject fake TCP traffic; such attacker does not need any
client agents to perform DoS (and other) attacks. However, we
consider the weaker - and more common - off-path attacker,
who can only send spoofed packets, and cannot block, inter-
cept or modify traffic. We show that even such weak attacker,
can exploit puppets to cause wide-scale congestion, with very
high amplification factor (i.e., a relatively modest number of
puppets suffice to clog large network links).
Specifically, we show how puppets can be used to launch
the two clogging-DoS attack which have the highest impact
(amplification) so far, the Opt-Ack attack [24] and the Ack-
storm attack [2], but using only puppets and an off-path
attacker (instead of requiring privileged malware and weak-
eavesdropping abilities, as in the original attacks). Further-
more, we explain how such attacks on specific connections,
can be combined to create effective congestion disrupting
connectivity of whole regions, extending and improving upon
the Coremelt attack [25], again requiring only puppets and
an off-path attacker, instead of the original requirement of
privileged malware.
The basic idea of our attacks is to use the off-path attacker
to send control packets to the TCP connection between puppet
and server, playing the role of the malicious client in Opt-Ack
and of the eavesdropping attacker in the Ack-Storm attack. To
do this, our attacker must be able to inject traffic into the TCP
connection; this is not trivial, since puppets are not given the
necessary information about a connection, such as the client,
port and sequence numbers (of the client and the server).
We show, however, that the attacker can obtain all necessary
information for the attack, namely, efficiently perform an off-
path TCP injection attack into the connections between the
puppets and the servers.
Our attacks can target either end of the TCP connection
(client or server). The injected data is of TCP control plane;
hence, these attacks hold even if the SSL/TLS protection is
employed. We show in experiments that using a relatively
small set of low-privileged malicious agents, e.g., scripts in
browser sandbox, the off path attacker can cause large amounts
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2of traffic leading to congestion.
A. Off-path TCP Injection Attacks
Over the years, TCP specifications and implementations
were enhanced to provide security against off-path attacks.
TCP implementations should randomize the 32-bit sequence
number [6] and the 16-bit client port [19]; for successful
injection, the adversary must provide valid values to these
fields. Since the adoption of randomized initial sequence
numbers and until recently, TCP was widely believed to be
immune to off-path (injection) attacks. One exception was the
off-path attacks on TCP of [27], which disconnected BGP
connections that use constant client ports; countermeasures
make this attack inapplicable today [10]. However, this attack
was considered as reflecting a very specific vulnerability
of BGP availability, and the widespread belief was that an
‘off-path’ spoofing attacker, cannot inject traffic into a TCP
connection, since it is infeasible for the attacker to guess
correct client port and sequence number. This belief is even
stated in RFCs and standards, e.g., in RFC 4953, discussing
on TCP spoofing attacks (see [26], Section 2.2). Indeed, since
its early days, most Internet traffic is carried over TCP - and
is not cryptographically protected, in spite of warnings, e.g.,
by Morris [20] and Bellovin [7], [8].
The first ‘proof of concept’ showing that TCP injection
attacks may still be possible, even with randomly-chosen
initial sequence numbers, was in [18]. This was recently
improved into efficient off-path TCP injection attacks [22],
[13], [23]; we could use these techniques to achieve our off-
path clogging attacks.
However, these existing attacks are limited, specifically,
both [22] and [23] require malware rather than puppets on the
client machine (albeit with limited privileges), while [13] ex-
ploits the use of globally-incrementing allocation mechanisms
for both ports and IP-IDs, as exists in the popular Windows
operating systems.
We present new variants of TCP injection attacks, with
further improved efficiency and avoiding both malware and
globally-incrementing IP-ID and ports assumptions (see com-
parison in Table I). Although Windows is very popular, avoid-
ing the globally-incrementing requirements still significantly
expands the base of clients which can be exploited for the
clogging attack; furthermore, these specific weaknesses may
be removed in future versions of Windows. Our new attacks
can also be used to extend the XSS, CSRF and phishing attacks
of [22], [13], [23] to these additional scenarios (puppet rather
than malware and avoiding the requirement of Windows-
specific properties).
B. Attacker and Network Model
Mallory, the attacker that we consider, is an off-path spoof-
ing attacker. Mallory cannot observe traffic sent to others;
specifically, she cannot observe the traffic between a client
C and a server S. However, Mallory can send spoofed packets,
i.e., packets with fake (spoofed) sender IP address. Due to
ingress filtering [17] and other anti-spoofing measures, IP
SC
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Fig. 1. Network Model. C enters www.mallory.com, the adversarial web
page. A script on that page forms a connection with www.s.com.
spoofing is less commonly available than before, but still
feasible, see [3], [11]. Apparently, there is still a significant
number of ISPs that do not perform ingress filtering for their
clients (especially to multihomed customers). Furthermore,
with the growing concern of cyberwarfare, some ISPs may
intentionally support spoofing. Hence, it is still reasonable to
assume spoofing ability. Spoofed packets were used in many
other attacks, including SYN-flood, DNS-poisoning and both
previous off-path injection attacks. Figure 1 illustrates our
model.
C. Contributions
This first contribution of this paper, is in presenting the very
effective off-path clogging DoS attacks, significantly more
efficient than previously known off-path clogging attacks such
as DNS reflection attacks. Furthermore, our attacks are the first
to show that off-path clogging can utilize TCP traffic.
Third, we investigate off-path variants to previous DoS
attacks which were known to require stronger adversaries:
either man-in-the-middle, or control of client end (i.e., bot).
We present an algorithm that allows an off-path adversary
to perform the Coremelt attack and disconnect a targeted
autonomous system from the Internet. We show that this
attack has significantly lower requirements (of the number and
location of agents) from the original Coremelt attack.
A second contribution allows an off-path attacker to effi-
ciently detect the client source port, if the client’s operating
system uses the Simple Hash-Based Port Selection Algorithm
recommended in [19]. This mechanism is deployed in Linux
and is extensively used, e.g., by Android; moreover, many
clients connect to the Internet via NATs, these devices com-
monly run Linux and use this selection algorithm for the
external port, making it the de-facto port selection algorithm of
many clients. Detection of the source port is a necessary first
step for efficient TCP injection, but also has additional security
implications, in particular, allowing traffic analysis (detection
of which clients connect to a server), as investigated in [14].
Our third contribution is a new, efficient off-path TCP injec-
tion attack, where an off-path adversary learns both the server
and client’s sequence numbers of the connection using only
a puppet. This improves over [22], [23] that assume malware
running on the victim machine (although with low privileges)
and only exposes the server’s sequence number. Our attack
3Identify Victim-Connection Learn Victim-Connection Sequence Numbers Shown Exploit
Lkm [18] Probe for connection(Client runs Windows, no firewall)
IP-ID side channel,
both seq. # obtained
(Client runs Windows)
None
Zhiyun et al. [22], [23] Monitor Connections with netstat/procfs(Malware)
Exploit seq # filtering,
only server’s seq. # obtained
(Malware; in [22] also sequence-checking firewall)
XSS, CSRF
(Malware, No TLS/SSL)
Gilad et al. [13]
Establish connection, exploits
sequential port allocation
(Puppet, client runs Windows)
IP-ID side channel,
both seq. # obtained
(Puppet, client runs Windows)
XSS, CSRF, phishing
(Puppet, no TLS/SSL)
This work
Establish connection,
Timing side-channel
(Puppet)
“Inject and Observe”,
both seq. # obtained
(Puppet, no TLS/SSL)
Denial of Service
(Puppet)
TABLE I
OFF-PATH TCP INJECTION ATTACKS, BUILDING BLOCKS AND THEIR REQUIREMENTS (SPECIFIED IN BRACKETS).
is also not specific to TCP implementation (platform) as the
technique in [13].
One last contribution is in introducing and modeling the
problem of clogging DoS attack optimization, which provides
a better measure of the potential risk of clogging due to
coordinated attacks utilizing many agents.
D. Organization
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents an outline of our attacks, and ‘breaks’ them to
modular structure of building blocks. Section III presents our
port de-randomization algorithm. Sections IV and V presents
our sequence number inference technique, for the server and
client numbers, respectively. Section VI presents and evaluates
the off-path variants of the Ack-Storm and Optimistic-Ack
attacks and Section VII builds on these attacks to perform a
variant of the Coremelt attack with agents with low-privileged
malicious agents. Section VIII presents defense mechanisms
that can be deployed in either the client or the server. Finally,
Section IX presents our conclusions from this work.
II. BACKGROUND AND BUILDING BLOCKS
In this section we divide the TCP injection technique into
building blocks which form a general scheme for performing
an off-path TCP injection attack. This scheme is modular: each
building block is a closed component, that can be implemented
in several ways under different assumptions. Indeed previous
off-path TCP injections [13], [22], [18] follow this scheme.
We present a high level description of each step and compare
implementations of the same block in previous attacks. The
reminder of this section describes each of the building blocks
and compares their implementation in existing attacks. Table
I presents a summary of the discussion below.
A. Identify Victim-Connection
Our first building block is to identify a TCP connection
to attack, i.e., a victim-connection. In [18] the adversary
actively scans the client machine to existing connection with
a particular server. As indicated within [18], the technique is
often detected and blocked firewalls. In [22], Mallory runs a
malicious application on the client machine (Android). The
adversary uses this application to monitor connections from
the client machines (e.g., by executing netstat).
In this work we assume that Mallory runs a puppet, i.e.,
script in browser’s sandbox and use this puppet to establish
the connection to which we inject traffic. We refer to this
connection as the ‘victim-connection’. A puppet can cause the
browser to establish a connection with a server of choice by
requesting an object such as an image to embed in a web
page, e.g., 〈img src=”http://www.server.com/img.jpg”\mskip\
medmuskip. The same technique was used in [13].
Once the adversary identifies that a connection between the
client and a server exists, she aims to learn the TCP four tuple,
i.e., IP addresses and ports of both peers, these parameters
identify the TCP connection. The adversary in [18] receives
the four tuple as result of probing. An adversary running
malware as in [22] obtains this information directly from
netstat output (or reading the corresponding file in procfs).
A puppet is more limited than malware and does not have
access to operating system information. In both puppet based
techniques (this paper and [13]) the adversary establishes the
connection. Therefore, three of the parameters in the TCP
four tuple are known: the client IP address, since the client
is connected to the www.mallory.com; the server IP address
and port, since the attacker chooses the remote-end for the
connection. Hence, it is only left to identify the client port.
In [13] the authors exploit the sequential port allocation im-
plemented in Windows; this predictable allocation mechanism
allows the adversary to guess the correct port of the connection
that the puppet established.
However, many operating systems make efforts to avoid
predictable port allocation, as recommended in [19]. Transport
layer client port randomization is a common countermeasure
against off-path (‘blind’) attacks; it was proposed as patch
to many attacks, including TCP RST attack [27] and DNS
poisoning [16]. Since the adversary cannot observe the traffic,
unpredictable client port provides an additional 16-bit random-
ness that the blind adversary must ‘hit’ in order to tamper with
the communication.
We focus on one of the algorithms, Simple Hash-Based Port
Selection, recommended in [19] and implemented in Linux.
This algorithm uses a random initial port for every destination;
4the port number is incremented for every connection. While
Mallory cannot observer the port that C uses to communicate
with S (cannot eavesdrop), we show how she can use the
puppet to: (1) open multiple connections between C and S,
and (2) learn the value of one of the allocated ports.
After such port is obtained, a binary search is performed
to obtain the last (highest) port that the C allocated. This
allows the adversary to identify client ports used in following
connections between C and S since following client-ports will
use the same counter.
Our technique is based on the Indirect Rate Reduction
attack, that fakes TCP congestion events. This attack was
suggested in [14] to identify the existing of TCP connections
via the Tor anonymity network. We perform this rate reduction
attack on different client ports and identify that a connection
exists through a particular client port if the puppet observes
a rate reduction, as follows from the TCP specification (cf.
an operating system flaw as used in [13]). Our technique
can possibly precede other off-path attacks to bypass port
randomization protection (for TCP).
B. Learn Victim-Connection Sequence Numbers
Once Mallory has identified the victim-connection, she
learns the sequence numbers; knowledge of these parameters
allows her to inject data to the connection. Observing the
sequence numbers directly from traffic requires either an on-
path attacker or privileged malware. Therefore, this option is
unavailable for the weak attackers considered in [18], [13],
[22] and this paper. Off-path TCP injection techniques provide
different methods to infer on the sequence numbers. We briefly
describe existing techniques and the one presented in this
paper.
We present a new TCP server sequence number inference
attack, that uses a radically different approach than the previ-
ous attacks. Specifically, the attacker sends to the client data
spoofed as coming from the server; by cleverly manipulating
client queries, we are able to actually read such data when
it falls into the flow control window. The data contains the
server sequence number, hence, when read by our puppet, the
puppet learns the server’s sequence number. While this attack
has to be done carefully to avoid connection reset, the result
is extremely efficient attack. We next describe this technique,
but before that, we recall for completeness the techniques used
in previous works.
1) Windows Specific, Bidirectional Exposure: In the Win-
dows TCP sequence number exposure attacks [13], [18], the
adversary exploits the global counter IP-ID implementation in
Windows. Mallory observes the difference in the IP-ID field in
packets that she receives from the client machine which tells
the number of packets that the client machine sent to other
destinations (since each packet increments the IP-ID).
In this technique, the attacker sends to the client crafted
spoofed packets (appear to be sent from the server). The client
responds to these packets only if they do specify incorrect
server sequence number, i.e., outside the client’s flow control
window. The client sends the response to the server and
Mallory learns whether the client responded by observing the
IP-ID field (in packets that she receives). After learning the
server’s sequence number, the techniques in [13], [18] exploits
Windows TCP implementation which filters incoming packets
according to their acknowledgment numbers (this mechanism
is not standard). This implementation allows the adversary to
learn which acknowledgment is valid (passes filtering) using
a similar side channel as the IP-ID. The acknowledgment
number that the client expects to receive is close or equal
to his sequence number.
2) Unidirectional Sequence Number Inference Attack: In
the sequence number inference attack [22], the adversary sends
spoofed packets to the client machine. Each packet specifies a
different, guessed sequence number. The observation in [22] is
that if the sequence number is not close from the value that the
client expects (i.e., the sequence number that server will next
use), then a firewall connecting the client to the network might
discard this packet. According to measurements in [22] 31.5%
of cellular carriers in the United-States deploy firewalls which
filter TCP packets by their sequence numbers; hence, their
costumers are vulnerable to the sequence inference attack.
The paper suggests two side channels that allow the adver-
sary to learn the current value of the counter. The first aids
globally incrementing IP-ID that might be deployed on routers
and other intermediate middle boxes. The adversary sends a
probe packet, spoofed as arriving from the server, that has TTL
value high enough to pass the firewall, but low enough to be
discarded by a following router; this packet will cause the
router to send an ICMP feedback to the spoofed source. The
adversary then sends a similar (but non-spoofed) packets to the
victim and learns according to the difference in IP-ID whether
the middle box responded to the probe. Another information
channel suggested by [22] is using the malware running on the
client to directly read a system file (under procfs) that specifies
the number of packets that arrived at the client machine since
boot time. Mallory learns that the sequence number specified in
a probe passed firewall filtering if that counter increments (i.e.,
client receives probe). The malware monitors this variable and
informs the attacker whether her packet arrived at the victim.
In this case that Mallory’s probe passes firewall filtering, she
identifies that the sequence number specified in the probe is
close to the correct sequence number. Once the attacker finds
some sequence number in the firewall window, she efficiently
finds the beginning of the window using a binary search.
This attack exposes the server’s sequence number, allowing
the adversary to inject data as the server, but not the client.
3) “Inject and Observe”, Bidirectional Sequence Number
Inference Attack: In this work we present a new technique
that allows an off-path adversary to learn the value of both
sequence numbers. Our technique assumes a standard TCP/IP
implementation (c.f. to [13]) and does not rely on leakage
via the IP-ID. Furthermore, since we assume only a puppet
running on the client machine, the adversary cannot receive
feedback from system files.
Our technique is divided into two phases. In the first step,
described in Section IV, Mallory learns the server’s sequence
5number. In this step Mallory tries to inject a probe packet to
the victim-connection; if successful, the puppet receives the
injected data which contains the sequence number specified
in the probe. The probability that Mallory exactly the next
sequence number in the probe packet is low ( 1232 ). However,
Mallory has a reasonable probability to specify a valid se-
quence number, one that is in the client’s flow control window.
We therefore send a probe that has meaningful parsing even
buffered in the client’s queue and is partially overrun by
genuine segments from the server.
Successful learning of the server’s sequence number is
required to perform the second phase, described in Section
V, where Mallory learns the client’s sequence number. We
employ a similar approach, however, knowledge of the server
sequence number allows sending packets that are discarded
if they specify future acknowledgment number and accepted
otherwise. This allows us to perform a binary search for the
acknowledgment number that the client expects (which equals
his sequence number).
In this step of the attack, the adversary sends a spoofed
packet to the client as the server, that specified correct se-
quence number (learned in previous step) and an Ack number.
This packet is discarded if its Ack number is higher than the
client’s sequence number (i.e., packet Acks something not yet
sent) and reaches the application otherwise. This step can also
extend the technique in [22] to allow bidirectional injection
i.e., allow the attacker to inject data to the server-side as well.
C. TCP Injection: Exploits
TCP injections have several exploits. Zhiyun et al. [22] show
that these can be exploited to perform cross-site scripting and
request forgery, Gilad et al. [13] show an additional exploit for
sophisticated phishing. In this paper we show a new type of
exploit: enhancing denial of service (DoS) attacks. We show
that by employing TCP injections, the adversary can perform
DoS attacks using puppet-nets that are equally as powerful
to botnets (i.e., controlled machines). As argued in [4], it
is relatively easy for attackers to control a large number of
puppets (cf. bots).
Scripts running in browsers have limited ability to launch
DDoS attacks. One reason is limitations placed by browsers on
the number of concurrent connections opened by the browser.
Another reason is that, due to their execution within a sandbox,
these scrips can only use standard TCP connections. In partic-
ular, if the attack succeeds in causing congestion and loss, then
TCP connections, including those of the puppets (scripts), will
significantly reduce their window size (and hence their traffic
rates). Therefore, while malicious Java Scripts can be used for
DDoS attacks, their impact is much less than that of ‘regular’
malware (zombies/bots). We show in Section VI how by using
TCP injections, the adversary can persuade the server to send
data in high rates, which is typically higher than the client’s
bandwidth.
In contrast to the data integrity exploits presented in [22]
and [13], the DoS exploits that we present use TCP control
plane to cause congestion. Since there is no attempt to inject
data to the application layer, even SSL/TLS protected sites are
vulnerable. Hence, these exploits are applicable on websites
that support HTTP connections, with or without SSL/TLS 1.
1) Denial of Service Exploits: We show how a spoofing,
off-path attacker, who controls a limited number of (weak)
puppets, can deploy formidable DoS attacks, which so far
were known to require stronger attacker capabilities: the Ack-
Storm attack [2] and the Optimistic-Ack attack [24]. Both
are DDoS attacks, which use TCP control plane to generate
excess amount of traffic. The Ack-Storm attack [2], is usually
performed by MitM adversaries, possibly with limited eaves-
dropping abilities. The Optimistic-Ack attack [24] typically
requires client cooperation (zombie) and persuades the server
to send data in a high capacity, more than that allowed by C’s
link. Since in both these attacks Mallory injects data only to
the TCP layer (and not to the application), these attacks also
work when the victim servers use SSL.
2) Large Scale DoS Attack: By launching the presented
off-path clogging attacks cleverly, simultaneously on multi-
ple client-server pairs, an attacker (Mallory) to conduct an
improved variant of the Coremelt attack [25] and congest a
core link of the Internet, using only puppets. We explore this
attack vector and introduce appropriate model and optimiza-
tion problem for the attacker, to evaluate the most effective
attack. Given a network graph, puppet locations and nodes to
disconnect from one another, the attacker establishes victim-
connections to servers, chosen according to their locations
in the network. DoS attacks based on TCP injections are
employed to disconnect victim nodes (e.g., an autonomous
systems) from the network.
III. IDENTIFY VICTIM CONNECTION: A PUPPET ONLY
TECHNIQUE
The first step in performing a TCP injection as described
in the previous section is to identify the victim-connection.
As described in Section II-A, since the adversary uses the
puppet to establish the victim-connection, she knows the client
address as well as the server address and port. In this section
we describe a new technique that allows an off-path adversary
running a puppet on a victim machine to learn the forth
parameter of the TCP four tuple: the client port.
As noted in Section II-A the client port is often randomized
by the operating system. Larsen et al. suggest in RFC 6056
[19] four client port allocation algorithms that are secure
against a blind adversary trying to identify the client port. In
this section we focus on the third suggestion: ‘Simple Hash-
Based Port Selection’. This algorithm is used by the Linux
kernel in versions 2.6.15 and above, i.e., from the year 2006;
therefore, it is embedded in all Android versions. In Simple
Hash-Based Port Selection, the operating system chooses a
pseudo-random initial port for each destination (server), then
for each new connection that the client establishes with that
destination, the current port is used and then incremented.
1For SSL/TLS websites, our exploit requires a different sequence numbers
exposure technique, i.e., those in [18], [22], [13], as the one in this paper
relays on injection of data.
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Fig. 2. Port De-randomization, Step 1: Establish new connection to S.
This protocol should be secure against off-path adversaries
since these are not aware of the initial port. In the technique
that we present below, the off-path adversary uses the puppet
running on the victim to (1) establish multiple connections to
the server, (2) time the server response time. The technique
has two repeated steps which we describe below, iteration
eliminates half the possible ports as used in the connections
established by the puppet.
The technique that we present below is executed in itera-
tions; each iteration eliminates half the possibilities for client
ports used in the connections allocated by the puppet. An
iteration is composed of two steps which: (1) connections
establishment, and (2) port elimination.
A. Step 1: Open Multiple Connections to S
A script running in browser context does not open a con-
nection directly; instead, the browser establishes a connection
with the server S when the script requests an object from S
(e.g., to dynamically embed a remote image to a web page).
However, a new connection is established only if there is no
existing connection with S (otherwise, request is sent on the
existing connection).
The adversary uses the puppet (script) to establish n > 1
connections to the server by manipulating DNS mapping
of attacker controlled domains. The puppet requests an ob-
ject from www1.mallory.com,. . . ,wwwn.mallory.com; since
Mallory controls the DNS records for these domains, she sets
the mapping of the domains to the same IP address, that of the
S. Browsers use domain-names to identify servers (cf. to IP
addresses); hence, this technique, which we verified on Firefox
and Chrome, opens n new connections to S, where n is the
maximal number of connections allowed (see value of n in
Subsection III-C). According to the port allocation algorithm,
the ports used in these connections are sequential, we use this
observation in the following step. Figure 2 describes this step
of the attack.
Note that in the following iteration, when the puppet will
open a new set of n connections to S, connections opened
in this step will be automatically closed by the browser, that
usually closes the least recently used connection when out of
resources (i.e., number of connections exceeds n).
B. Step 2: Port Elimination
In this step, illustrated in Figure 3, Mallory sends probes to
the client C. These probes are spoofed and appear to be coming
from S. The destination port (i.e., client port) specified in the
probe packets is the one tested by the adversary. Probes are
crafted to persuade the receiver to respond with a duplicate
Ack if they belong a connection, i.e., the destination port is
one of those allocated by the client machine in the first step. A
sequence of three duplicate Acks that C sends S will slow the
connection, this effect is measured by the puppet who notifies
Mallory.
A probe packet is a TCP packet that specifies a random
sequence number; we assume the likely case, that this 32-
bit field is out of C’s flow control window. In this case,
according to the TCP specification [21] (page 69), the receiver
immediately responds to the source with a duplicate acknowl-
edgment. A sequence of three duplicate acknowledgments is
interpreted by TCP as loss and will cause the sender (S) to exit
TCP slow start and enter congestion avoidance state. In TCP
slow start, the congestion window (cwnd), which decides the
number of packets that can be transmitted in a round trip time
(i.e., without receiving an Ack) grows exponentially, while in
congestion avoidance it grows linearly. Furthermore, a loss
event will significantly reduce the congestion window (up to
half the original size).
In the elimination step Mallory sends three probes to all
ports p = offset (mod 2in), where i is the current iteration
number and offset is initialized to 1 and updated every itera-
tion. In each iteration, the puppet requests a small object from
all connection ports that she established, this by requesting an
image from www1− n.mallory.com. The puppet times each
response and tests whether the time to load one object was
significantly longer than others (in our experiments average
measured increased by more than 120%). The feedback that
the puppet returns to Mallory is a bit: b = 0 if there was a
longer response, indicating that Mallory had probed one of the
connection ports, and b = 1 otherwise.
The probes need to be synchronized with a puppet request
for an object: although not written in the specification, we have
found that many web-server (in particular those running Linux)
validate when they receive three duplicate acknowledgments
that there are at least three packets ‘in-flight’ (i.e., un-acked)
that they have sent to the client. Therefore, the restriction
is that the client sends the duplicate acknowledgments after
sending the request to the server. If there is no reordering
in the network, this method ensures that the server will send
the response before handling the duplicate acknowledgments.
Notice that the client sends the duplicate Acks before actually
receiving the server’s response. We refer to this time frame in
Figure 3 as the Mallory’s probe sending window.
At the end of the step, Mallory updates the attack state
according to puppet’s feedback: offset← offset+n+b ·2i−1n.
The reason that n is always added to the offset is to account
for the n connections established in this iteration. After the
final port elimination step, the value p indicates a connection
port.
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C. Implementation and Limitations
The Linux kernel chooses client port from the range
[32768, 61000] this is significantly a smaller range than all
available ports, i.e., [1, 216 − 1]. This observation to im-
prove the search run time (only probing ports in the smaller
range). The maximal number of connections that the puppet
may open, i.e., n, changes according the version of the
browser. However, this value is at least 32 in modern browser
and typically increases with new releases [9]. These num-
bers imply that port de-randomization technique will require
dlog2(61000− 32768)e = 15 iterations to complete, and
Mallory will send
⌈∑15
i
61000−32768
n·2i
⌉
=
⌈∑15
i
28232
32·2i
⌉
= 883
probe-triplets.
The first requirement of the port exposing technique is that
the web pages support persistent HTTP connections. In such
connections, all requests are over the same (victim) connection
and ensure it does not close. Persistent HTTP connections
are the default configuration of apache servers and are also
employed by many large web-servers (e.g., Facebook, Yahoo!,
Google), but not all (e.g., live.com). We require persistent
connections since otherwise, the connections opened in step 1
of this attack will close by step 2.
The second requirement of the port exposing technique is
that the connection will not enable the selective acknowl-
edgment (SACK) TCP option. This option allows the re-
ceiver specify exactly which packet arrives when sending
an acknowledgment. The three duplicate acknowledgments
sent in our attack are identical (specify the same SACK
option), i.e., indicate that no server packet had arrived be-
tween these packets. In this case the server, who receives
these acknowledgments, may treat these as a single duplicate
acknowledgment and will not reduce the rate. We also specify
this mechanism as possible defense in Section VIII (Defenses).
Figure 4 shows the portion of 1000 web-servers that comply
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Fig. 4. Portion of popular websites that comply with attack requirements.
with either and both these requirements.
D. Empirical Evaluation
We evaluated the port exposure attack described in this
section. Our initial results show that the technique has high
success rate (over 70%). We are currecntly working on further
improving theses results. In the following versions of this
paper we will include details and graphs on our experiments.
IV. SEARCH FOR SERVER’S SEQUENCE NUMBER
In this section we present the first phase of “inject and
observe”, a technique for learning the sequence numbers used
in the victim-connection; we follow the high level design
presented in Section II-B3. At the end of this phase Mallory
learns the server’s sequence number; this allows her to send
data to the client impersonating as the server. We assume
that Mallory has the parameters of the victim-connection, in
particular, that she identified the client port; e.g., by executing
the technique described in the previous section (or other
methods, see Table I).
Subsection IV-A provides required background, explaining
how browsers handle HTTP responses that they receive. Sub-
section IV-B describes our search technique. In the following
section we present the second phase of “inject and observe”,
where Mallory learns the client’s sequence number; in that
section we provide an empirical evaluation for the entire
procedure.
A. Browser HTTP Request/Response Handling
Browsers support persistent HTTP connections and request
pipelining since HTTP 1.1 ([12]). These allow sending of
multiple requests to the same server in pipeline over a single
TCP connection. The responses from the server are buffered
and ordered according to the browser’s flow control window,
denoted by wnd (allocated per-connection). This window is
important to our attack; it specifies the range of disordered
bytes that the TCP receiver (browser) can keep, its size
is typically 216. Data bytes whose corresponding sequence
number is in cwnd are buffered in a receive-queue for the
application (browser), other arriving data is discarded.
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Fig. 5. Server Sequence Number Learning Technique.
The browser keeps a queue for transmitted HTTP requests
and waits for a response if that queue is not empty; i.e., reads
from the TCP ‘received-buffer’ until reading a full response.
The response’s HTTP layer is parsed and its encapsulating
data is then embedded in the web page, the request is removed
from the queue. This process continues until there are no more
requests awaiting reply from the particular connection.
Unfortunately, the HTTP specification does not tell the
appropriate action when a response does not have a valid
HTTP header (i.e., parsing fails). The de-facto standard, used
by current versions of Internet Explorer, Firefox and Chrome
(and possibly other browsers as well) encapsulates all data that
is available for reading, i.e., sequence of received bytes starting
from the low bound of cwnd, under the following single HTTP
header:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Length: available-data-size
Browsers do not break the existing TCP connection in this
case and continue processing requests over it. We believe
that this behavior, which essentially displays content data as
plain text, was introduced in early days of the Internet to
handle misbehaving servers and was mimicked in modern
implementations. The following subsection explains how this
behavior is exploited to learn the server’s sequence number.
B. Inject and Observe
In this subsection we present the server sequence number
learning technique which is illustrated in Figure 5. The search
has two steps ‘Inject’ and ‘Observe’.
In the Inject step, illustrated by the top packets in Figure
5, Mallory sends spoofed packets that appear to belong to the
victim connection. Each of these packets specifies a sequence
number that is |wnd| greater than the previous one. Mallory
writes (as part of the TCP data) the packet’s sequence number
and prependers it with padding.
All the packets that Mallory sends except for one are
immediately discarded by C since the sequence number that
they specify is out of wnd boundaries. For simplicity, we
Mallory's injected 
data
cwnd shifts forward for every request
Fig. 6. The state of wnd after ‘Inject’ step.
assume that the packet that is saved in C’s buffer does not
begin at the lowest offset in wnd2. C responds to every packet
that Mallory sends with a duplicate Ack; this will cause
connection slow down (but not breakdown) as we exploited in
the previous section, however, this does not effect the sequence
number learning process.
There is an additional validation that is performed on
the acknowledgment number specified in received packets. It
verifies that the packet does not specify a future Ack; we refer
(and exploit) to this condition extensively in the following
section. In this section the attacker is therefore required to send
two packets for each sequence number, one specifies Ack = α
and the other specifies Ack = α+ 231; ensuring that the Ack
in one packet is valid.
After this step, C’s victim-connection wnd is as illustrated
in Figure 6.
In the following Observe step, the puppet requests objects
from S. It ensures that there is always at least one request
waiting for reply in the browser’s queue; this by generating
two initial requests and sending a new request when a response
arrives. See illustration in Figure 5. The reason that one request
must be in queued is that when there are no pending requests,
some browsers clear the receive buffer (those will discard the
injected data); this behavior was verified on Mozilla Firefox
and Google Chrome.
Each response that arrives at C shifts cwnd forward; eventu-
ally, the injected data that was saved in the previous step will
be used as a response. Some of the last server’s response might
overlap the injected data. The TCP specification determines
that in this case the more recent data is used, this essentially
means that some of the injected data will be lost. The
padding that prepends the sequence number in the response
is dispensable data, that is of the server’s response size; it
ensures that the sequence number value is not overrun by a
server’s response.
The requests that the puppet sends are for arbitrary objects
that will yield an HTTP 404 response (object not found). The
reason that we prefer receiving such responses is that they
are relatively short which reduces the amount of data that the
adversary sends. Furthermore, using such requests makes the
attack generic: Mallory need not identify specific objects to
obtain for every remote server she uses.
When the puppet reads a response that does not specify
2The probability that this event occurs is rather small: packet-length|wnd| ≤
1500
216
≈ 0.02.
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‘object not found’ it sends the response to Mallory who finds
the sequence number; adding the length of the packet she sends
she identifies the next sequence number. 3
The technique that we presented in this subsection requires
the adversary to send a number of packets that is linear to
the number of sequence numbers. Specifically, the adversary
sends during the ‘Inject’ step 2 2
32
216 = 2
17 packets.
V. SEARCH FOR CLIENT’S SEQUENCE NUMBER
In this section we present the second phase of the ‘inject
and observe’ technique. At the end of this phase Mallory learns
the client’s sequence number; this allows her to send data to
the server impersonating as the client. We show how Mallory
can perform a binary search for the Ack number that the client
expects which equals the sequence number that the client will
next send. This step assumes that Mallory has the parameters
of the victim-connection and learned the server’s sequence
number. Our technique also extends the one presented in [22]
which detects the server’s sequence number.
Subsection V-A provides necessary background on TCP’s
packet processing, Subsection V-B presents the binary search
technique.
A. TCP Receiver Packet Handling
In the technique that we describe in the following subsection
Mallory learns whether some acknowledgment number is
above or below the sequence number that the client will next
use, denoted by NXT. Since the sequence number is a cyclic
field, when we write above or below, we refer to the drawing
in Figure 8. The figure illustrates a division of the Ack field
values into three intervals: in the gray area (sent and Acked)
and the black area (sent, but not Acked) are numbers below
NXT. In the white area are sequence numbers above NXT.
The test is derived from an observation from the TCP spec-
ification [21] (Section 3.9, page 72). The relevant statement
refers to an acknowledgment packet that carries data and
contains a valid sequence number; i.e., success in learning
the server sequence number is required to initiate this phase.
The specification distinguishes between two cases regarding
the acknowledgment number in the packet.
Case 1: the packet contains a duplicate Ack (gray area
in Figure 8), or acknowledges data that was sent, but not
already acknowledged (black area in Figure 8). In this case,
3Since the puppet (Java Script) runs in context of Mallory domain, they
can communicate without restrictions.
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Fig. 8. Ack Number Map. UNA is the lowest unacknowledged sequence
number, NXT is the next sequence number that C will send. The 32-bit Ack
field is cyclic.
the recipient continues processing the packet regularly (see
[21]) and the application will receive the data bytes.
Case 2: In the complementary case, that the acknowledg-
ment number is for data that was not yet sent (white area in
Figure 8), the recipient discards the packet.
B. Inject and Observe
We now describe the Inject and Observe technique to learn
the Ack value. Each iteration of Inject and Observe eliminates
half of the possible values to the Ack field. We initiate this
phase assuming that all Ack values are possible. Let ack-low
denote the lowest possible value for the acknowledgment field
and let l denote the number of possible values for the field;
initially, ack-low = 0, l = 232.
In every iteration of the search the puppet requests a HTML
page and the adversary provides a response injected to the TCP
stream by specifying the server’s sequence number learned
in the previous step, denoted by σ. The adversary sends two
HTTP responses that specify different pages: r1 and r2. The
response packets specify the acknowledgment numbers α′ =
ack-low, α′′ = ack-low + 12 l. According to the observation
above, one of these packets specifies an Ack that is not above
the true Ack value that the recipient expects (NXT) and will be
discarded. Therefore, the puppet receives either r1 or r2 and
will report the result to Mallory. Figure 9 illustrates a search
iteration.
Let α be the ack number of the packet that arrive at the client
(identified by puppet’s feedback). After each iteration Mallory
updates the parameters ack-low, l and σ: ack-low← α, l← l2
and σ ← σ+response-size in order to account for the injected
data.
1) Binary Search for α: The Inject and Observe technique
above discovers the sequence number in a binary search
methodology. The ‘before’ and ‘after’ terminology used in
the TCP specification (illustrated in Figure 8) divides the
possible values of the Ack field to similar-sized areas: the
gray and white areas in Figure 8 are of equal size, and the
black area (sent bytes without acknowledgment) is usually
relatively small. Therefore, each iteration of the attack elimi-
nates approximately half the possible values for the field. This
allows Mallory to perform a binary search for NXT; each time
eliminating approximately half the possible numbers. The 32-
bit length of the Ack field implies that there are 32 iterations.
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C. Empirical Evaluation
We evaluated the inject and observe technique described
in this section. Our initial results, which will be included
in following versions of this paper, show that the technique
has considerable success rate as a standalone componenet and
when combined with the port exposure technique described in
this paper (over 30% and 20% respectively). We are currecntly
working on improving theses results.
VI. DENIAL-OF-SERVICE EXPLOITS
We next describe possible exploits of long-lived-connection
injection attacks to disrupt network communication. Namely,
we show how attackers can build on off-path injection tech-
niques, to launch formidable Distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attacks. As before, we consider an off-path IP-
spoofing attacker, who also controls a significant number of
low-privileged malwares or ‘puppets’, i.e., scripts running in
browsers of unsuspecting users.
Performing typical denial of service attacks with weak
malicious agents is challenging, as we motivated in Subsection
II-C.
A. Off-Path Optimistic Ack Attack
We first describe Off-path Optimistic Ack; this is a variant of
the Optimistic Ack DoS attack [24]. These attacks cheat TCP’s
congestion control mechanism, causing senders to believe that
most of the data they sent was already received, and hence
that they can send more data (congestion window is not full),
and also to increase the size of the congestion window and as
a result, the sending rate. This can result in huge amplification
factors, see [24], unless servers use per-connection bandwidth
quotas or use other defenses.
In both Optimistic Ack attacks (ours and the original [24]),
the attacker sends to the server acknowledgment packets
(Acks), as if the client received all packets sent by the server
(although packets are still in transit or even lost). As a result,
the server continues sending information, with increasing
rates.
In the original attack [24], the client must run malware,
with ability to send ‘raw IP’ packets (i.e., not according to the
TCP specifications). This is a significant requirement; recent
operating systems make it harder for malware to obtain such
ability, which may only be available to privileged (i.e., ‘root’)
programs. Furthermore, the original attack may be blocked by
a firewall on the client side, by detecting the unusual high
rate. Note that since by requiring only puppets, attacker is
more likely to control enough clients to succeed in the attack,
in spite of server-side countermeasures such as per-connection
quotas.
1) Off-Path Variant Attack Process: A TCP injection attack
allows an attacker to perform an off-path variant of the
Optimistic Ack attack as follows. The attacker only needs a
puppet on the client machine to open the TCP connection
with the victim server and learn the client port and sequence
numbers. Following this, the puppet requests some large object
from the server and is no longer needed; the attacker sends
Ack packets as done by the client in the original attack, and
- if not using SSL/TLS - the attacker can even send new
request(s) if needed (instead of the client). Note that even
if the client’s firewall detects the attack and begins blocking
packets on this connection from both directions, this does not
help since we provide the Acks to the server from the off-
path attacker. Furthermore, RFC-compliant RST packets that
the firewall (or client) may send, would be out of the server’s
flow control window and hence ignored, and would not tear
the connection. Server-induced verifications, by intentionally
dropping or reordering packets periodically, as suggested in
[24], seem one of the best (or only) defenses.
B. Off-Path Ack-Storm DoS Attack
In the original Ack-Storm DoS attack [2], the attacker needs
to have some ability to eavesdrop on packets. From these
packets, the attacker learns the TCP parameters (IP addresses,
ports, and sequence numbers). Using these, the attacker sends
two spoofed data packets, one to each of the two ends of
the connection. According to the TCP specification, and in
most TCP implementations, upon receiving an Ack for data
that was not yet sent, TCP sends back a ‘duplicate Ack’ -
i.e., resends the previously sent Ack. As a result of receiving
the pair of spoofed data packets, one at each peer, both peers
begin sending acknowledgment packets to each other. Since
these Acks acknowledge data which was actually sent by the
attacker, not by the peer, then each of these Acks will only
result in another duplicate Ack returned, and this ‘ping-pong’
process will continue indefinitely.
The attacker can send additional data packets to the peers,
causing additional ping-pong exchanges, quickly filling-up the
channel capacity. This causes increased load on the networks;
the fact that the packets involved in the attack are very short
(just Acks), makes the load on routers and switches even
higher. Eventually, this causes packet losses, and legitimate
TCP connections sharing the same links significantly reduce
their rate.
1) Off-Path Variant Attack Process: The off-path Ack-
Storm DoS Attack works exactly like the regular Ack-Storm
DoS Attack, except for employing the injection techniques to
allow the off-path attacker to learn the TCP parameters. Hence,
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its capacity in mbps.
the attacker can run this attack without requiring the ability to
eavesdrop.
C. Empirical Evaluation
We used the topology illustrated in Figure 10 to test the off-
path denial of service attacks that we presented. In our tests
we assume that Mallory runs a puppet on C and can inject
data to the TCP connection between C and S (a connection
that Mallory caused C to establish).
We measure the degradation of service that these attacks
cause to other legitimate connections. We consider different
round-trip times (RTTs) for the legitimate connections that
we measure: the longer the RTT is, the greater the congestion
windows. Since every loss halves the congestion window,
a more significant effect is observed when RTT is high.
Furthermore, a higher RTT implies that it will take more
time for the legitimate TCP sender to detect a packet loss
and retransmit. We compare the effect of these attacks to line
1 in Figure 11 (base-line) which illustrates the time it takes
C* to receive a 50MB file from S* under normal conditions.
1) Off-Path Optimistic Ack Evaluation: In this attack we
aimed to clog the S’s link: Mallory uses C to request some
large file from S and then performs the Optimistic Ack attack,
persuading S to send data to C at high a rate. We evaluated the
effect of this attack by measuring the degradation of service in
a connection that S has with some other client C* who tries to
download a 50MB file. Lines 1 and 2 in Figure 11 illustrate our
results. Notice the significant difference in attacker and server
link capacities; the amplification ratio measured in this attack
is 78 (for every byte that Mallory sends, S sends approximately
78 bytes). Furthermore, the attack also clogs C’s link, as shown
by line 4.
2) Off-Path Ack-Storm Evaluation: We use the Ack-Storm
attack to congest C’s link and measure the effect on a different
connection that he has with some other server S*. In order to
congest the link, Mallory creates a new Ack ‘ping-pong’ every
100 ms; to create each ping-pong Mallory sends only two short
(40B) packets. In the connection with S*, C tries to download
a 50MB file (similar to the previous experiment). Lines 1 and
3 compare the file transfer time at a normal time, to that when
the Ack-Storm attack takes place. This attack requires much
less effort and lower bandwidth than the Opt-Ack attack, i.e.,
has much higher amplification ratio. However, the Ack-Storm
attack is limited by the client bandwidth (which is typically
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Fig. 11. Evaluation of Ack-Storm and Opt-Ack DoS attacks. The legend
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connection (that Mallory degrades). Measurements are the average of 50 runs,
error-bars mark the standard deviations.
lower than the server’s); this limitation is illustrated by line 5
which is very similar to line 1 (normal conditions).
VII. OFF-PATH COREMELT ATTACK
The two DoS attacks which we described in Section VI can
be launched using only puppets and have high amplification
ratio, it follows that even relatively weak attackers may be able
to cause large amounts of traffic from many clients spread
around the network. This can cause high load on servers,
routers and links.
In particular, by choosing well the pairs of clients and
servers between which the attacks are launched, the attackers
can cause huge amounts of traffic to flow over specific ‘victim’
backbone routers and links. These backbone networks, con-
necting large core ISPs (autonomous systems), have very high
capacities; by sending enough traffic to a particular destination,
attacker can cause queuing and losses in the connecting router.
As a result, Internet connectivity may break - first for TCP
connections and then even for UDP applications.
We use the term Off-path Coremelt Attack for the resulting
attack on core Internet connectivity, since it is an off-path
variant of the Coremelt attack [25]. The Coremelt attack uses
a large botnet, sending large amounts of traffic between pairs
of the bots, with the pairs chosen intentionally so that huge
amounts of traffic will flow over specific victim link/router. As
shown by simulations in [25], this can result in congesting the
victim link/router and breaking connectivity in the Network.
We discuss the attack and analyse it, presenting an interesting
optimization problem for the attacker; notice that similar
analysis is applicable to the original Coremelt (and was not
presented so far).
A. Off-Path Variant Attack Process
In the Off-path Coremelt attack, the attacker congests a
core link or router; however, instead of depending on pairs of
zombies (bots), here the attack just requires a puppet at one
end. The other end of the connection is a legitimate server,
and to cause huge amounts of traffic, the attacker uses one of
the two off-path DoS attacks described above.
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This attack has three advantages compared to the original
Coremelt attack: (1) controlling a large and correctly-dispersed
set of puppets is easier than controlling a comparable set
of zombies; (2) we only need to control one end of each
connection (puppet), not both ends; and (3) since we use
adversary-chosen servers, these can have very high bandwidth,
higher than available to most bots.
B. Problem Statement and Adversarial Algorithm
The off-path Coremelt attack involves a non-trivial opti-
mization problem for the adversary, i.e., how to cause maximal
damage using the resources available to her, namely, mainly,
the bandwidth of the attacker, i.e., of the attacking node
itself, as well as the capacities of its puppets. The damage is
essentially measured by the number of disconnected < v, d >
pairs, where v is a victim client and d is a destination (server
that the victim needs to access). We note that both Opt-Ack
and Ack-Storm attacks, utilize the unwitting cooperation of
server machines at the other end of the connections; while in
principle, such unwitting servers are also a limited resource,
we believe that in practice there are so many such servers that
we can safely ignore this limitation, as other limitations would
almost always be the bottleneck.
This ‘real’ optimization problem is quite complex; we
present and analyze a version with several significant sim-
plifications, which, nevertheless, results in a very effective
attack, significantly improving compared to the ‘original’ off-
core attack [25]. More detailed modeling and analysis, and
more efficient algorithms, may allow an even more effective
attack, and remain a challenge for future research.
Intuitively, the goal of the attacker is to break connectivity
between autonomous systems (ASs), by congesting links with
excessive traffic. Notice that this ignores the possibility that
it may be sometimes more effective to attack some intra-
AS link, e.g., the ‘last mile’ connection of a particular host
(destination server, or even client); we focus on ‘core-melt-
like’ attacks, which focus on inter-AS links. Attackers can
only further optimize by congesting intra-AS links, when it is
more effective.
We focus on significantly degrading the performance of TCP
connections. TCP is the most widely-used transport protocol,
and due to its congestion-control mechanisms, it is very
sensitive to packet loss (as in a clogging attack); as explained
in [2], a very low loss rate suffices to cause major degradation
of TCP performance. In particular, sending roughly as many
packets as the link capacity, surely ensures sufficient, even
significant, loss rate.
For clogging TCP connections, the attacker can utilize both
off-path attacks (Ack-Storm and Opt-Ack), choosing effective
mix of the two, based on the given topology of attacker pup-
pets, victims and servers. The Ack-Storm attack requires the
attacker to send new packets whenever on of the attack packets
is lost; hence, it is only effective for low loss rates. Indeed,
intuitively, the Opt-Ack attack seems much more effective,
due to its huge amplification factor; in our measurements, we
found average amplification factor of µ = 78, which is very
impressive - although significantly less than the amplification
reported by the original Opt-Ack research (and incomparable
to the theoretical analysis presented there), see [24]4. For
simplicity, in our analysis we simply assume that Opt-Ack
attacks result in fixed bandwidth amplification of µ, i.e., if the
attacker dedicates bandwidth of x bytes per second to Opt-
Ack attack by sending it to a particular server s, injected
into connection with some (attacking-puppet) client c, then
the result is transmission of µ ·x bytes from s to c. We ignore
the (nominal) amount of traffic required for this attack by the
client attacking-puppet c.
In contrast, the Ack-Storm attack requires the puppets of
the attacker to send one packet per each packet sent by the
abused server at the other end of the connection. However,
notice that Opt-Act amplification factor applies to packet
sent by the attacker, not by the puppets; and with Ack-
Storm, significant degradation is possible already with low loss
rates, e.g., even 0.1% by our measurements, which essentially
implies amplification factor of 1000 (for the packets sent by
the attacker). Hence, for Opt-Ack attacks, the limiting factor
is usually the capacity of the attacker (albeit amplified by µ),
and for Ack-Storm attacks, the limiting factor is usually the
capacity of the attacking puppet (without amplification).
Hence, the following simplification seems reasonable; we
assume that the attacker bandwidth is essentially used to its
maximal capacity for Opt-Ack attacks, and the capacity of
attacker-controlled puppets (puppets and marios) is used for
Ack-Storm attacks, ignoring the small additional amount of
attacker traffic required also for Ack-Storm attacks and the
small amount of attacking-puppet capacity used for Opt-Ack
attack. This allows us to design the attacker strategy in two
separate steps: first, we analyze the best allocation of the
attacker bandwidth to Opt-Ack attacks; and then we analyze
the best allocation of the capacity of the attacker puppets, to
Ack-Storm attacks.
For both allocations, we assume that the adversary knows
the topology and routing of the AS-level Internet routing
network, for example, as provided by route views [1]. We
model the topology of this network as a graph G = (A,E),
where A is the set of Autonomous Systems (ASs), and E is the
set of links (edges) between ASs. For every link (f, t) ∈ E, let
c(f,t) ∈ [0,∞) be the capacity of (f, t). As explained above,
the goal of the adversary is to clog one or more links, causing
maximal damage, i.e., disconnecting the maximal number of
< v, d > pairs; clogging link (f, t) ∈ E essentially means
causing c(f,t) or more traffic to be sent over link (f, t).
We assume that both attacker traffic and legitimate traffic,
use fixed, known routes; for any given source AS s ∈ A and
destination AS d ∈ A, let the route from s to d, denoted
r(s, d) = {(fi, ti)}li=1, be a sequence of some number l of
edges (in E), such that f1 = s, tl = d, and for every i : 1 ≤
i < l holds ti = fi+1.
4We believe the difference between our results and these of [24], may be
mostly due to differences in the (default?) quotas and other restrictions, of
the web servers used.
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Each of the relevant entities - victims, destinations, puppets
and the attacker herself - reside in one of the ASs in A. For
simplicity, we assume a single attacker, in a specific AS, with
bandwidth αA; without loss of generality, we assume this is
AS number 666. In contrast, victims, destinations and attacker
puppets are spread among the ASs. For simplicity, we just
consider two (potentially overlapping) subsets of A, denoted
Av and Ad, and representing the ASs containing victims and
destinations, respectively (i.e., we ignore the issue of how
many victims and destinations are in each AS). Finally, for
every AS a ∈ A, we let αa denote the (total) bandwidth of
attacking puppets in AS a.
For simplicity, we assume that every AS contains sufficient
number of servers that the attacker can use in Opt-Ack and
Ack-Storm attacks, to generate traffic. Let αa,s denote the
amount of traffic used in Ack-Storm attack, from attacking
puppets in AS a to the servers in AS s, and let αA,c,s be
the amount of Opt-Ack attack traffic that the attacker sends to
server in AS s, for a connection with client in AS c. Clearly,
we have the following restrictions, for every a ∈ A:
αa ≥
∑
s
αa,s (1)
αA ≥
∑
s
∑
c
αA,c,s (2)
We next require that the total traffic on each link, including
Opt-Ack traffic (from attacker to server, and then, amplified by
µ, from server to client) and Ack-Storm traffic (from client to
server and back), is not greater than the link capacity, namely,
for every (f, t) ∈ E, we have:
c(f, t) ≥
∑
<s,c>|(f,t)∈r(s,c)
µ · αA,c,s +
+
∑
s|(f,t)∈r(A,s)
∑
c
αA,c,s +
+
∑
a,s∈A|(f,t)∈r(a,s)
(
αa,s + αs,a
)
(3)
We denote the right term in Equation 3 by T (f, t), i.e., the
transmitted communication over the edge (f, t). Finally, we
want to maximize the number disconnected pairs < v, d >.
We use the same criteria as the original Coremelt attack and
consider a pair < v, d > disconnected if there exists a link
on the route between them that is loaded up to its capacity.
Denote by x<v,d> an indicator variable for clogged routes:
x<v,d> = 1, If: ∃ (f, t) ∈ r(v, d) | c(f, t) = T (f, t)
x<v,d> = 0, Otherwise (4)
Our goal function is:
max
∑
<v,d>
x<v,d> (5)
We have stated the off-path Coremelt attack as a maximiza-
tion problem and would like to use linear programming to
solve it, i.e., find the amount of data sent by each attacking
node to every server (denoted by α variables). However, the
indicator variables defined in Equation 4 cannot be represented
as linear terms since the quantitative ‘∃’ is not linear. We solve
a relax version of the maximization problem where the target
function and constraints are as the regular definition of the
problem, but the definition of the indicator variables change.
Let Cut(G) denote the minimal cut of the network graph G
with respect to the sets of victims and destinations. For every
pair < v, d >, denote by target(v, d) the edge with minimal
capacity such that target(v, d) ∈ r(v, d) and target(v, d) ∈
Cut(G). Define:
x<v,d> = 1, If: c(target(v, d)) = T (target(v, d))
x<v,d> = 0, Otherwise (6)
In the relaxed version we target specific links in the route
between victims and destinations, those that belong to the
minimal cut. This restriction allows stating the attack as a
linear programming maximization problem: the goal function
is Equation 5 and the constraints are given by Equations 1 -
3.
VIII. DEFENSE MECHANISMS
The attacks presented in this paper relay on successful
exposure the client port and sequence numbers. In this section
we propose remedies, mitigating the attack vectors considered
in this paper. We describe both immediate patches that can be
deployed with only minor modifications longer term remedies
that require modifications to existing implementations and
deployed devices. The remedies purposed below are of two
types, those deployed at the client-end, and those deployed at
the server-end. Each mechanism blocks the attack even if the
other peer is vulnerable.
A. Server-End Defense
1) Mitigation for Client Port Exposure: A server can mit-
igate the port exposure technique described in Section III by
enabling the selective Ack (SACK) TCP option. This option is
supported by most modern client operating systems (including
Linux) and is usually advertised in the client’s SYN packet.
However, we found that web-server rarely enable this option
which is therefore typically not employed (see measurements
in Figure 4). When the SACK option is employed, every
Ack that the client sends to the server specifies the sequence
numbers corresponding to data that was received. This allows
the sender, in case that one of his packets is lost, to identify
and resend only the lost packet.
In our attack, the three duplicate Acks that the client
sends result from three sequential (spoofed) packets that the
adversary sends. The SACK field in these acknowledgments
is identical and identifies that these packets did not originate
from three server-sent packets (since otherwise, the SACK
field in every duplicate Ack would have increased for every
packet). The server should handle such multiple duplicate
Acks with identical SACK fields as a single duplicate Ack.
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The mechanism is already implemented in Linux (but typically
disabled).
2) Mitigation for Sequence Number Exposure: The tech-
niques presented in Sections IV-V for learning the client-
server sequence numbers inject data to the TCP stream;
injected data is then observed by the puppet who feedbacks
the attacker. In order to ensure data integrity, cryptographic
mechanisms should be deployed; i.e., servers should use
SSL/TLS instead of relying on randomized initial sequence
numbers for authentication.
B. Client-End Defense
1) Mitigation for Client Port Exposure: Clients can modify
the port selection algorithm used by the operating system. Of
the three remaining algorithms suggested in [19], algorithm
four is closely related to the Simple Hash-Based Port Selection
algorithm exploited in this paper and might be vulnerable to
similar attack. Hence other algorithms are preferred.
However, in many cases modification of port allocation
algorithm on the client machine does not suffice to prevent
the attack. Many clients are connected to the Internet via
NAT devices; these middle-boxes allocate each connection
an external port and typically run an embedded version of
Linux, i.e., use a vulnerable algorithm. Similar modifications
are required to these devices as well.
2) Mitigation for Sequence Number Exposure: The server
sequence number exposure attack that we presented in this
work exploits de-facto standard browser behavior which is not
required by standard: display corrupt responses to the user.
Browsers can modify this behavior and in case that a response
does not pass HTTP parsing, send a TCP reset to the server
and close the connection. This modification conforms with the
HTTP standard and protects the user from the attack vector
considered in this paper.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work present and evaluate a new technique for off-
path TCP injections. We show that a common implementation
of client port randomization is vulnerable to off-path prediction
attack. We investigate known DoS attacks in a new setting,
one where the adversary is able to inject data into the TCP
connection and show that this allows their deployment under
weaker assumptions: puppets instead of bots, off-path instead
of on-path attackers. This work continues the line of recent
works on TCP injections, showing that the folklore belief
that TCP is immune to off-path adversaries is incorrect. We
motivates deployment of cryptographic protocols to protect
communication, such as SSL/TLS and IPsec and believe that
a more significant portion of servers should use these defenses,
even if communication is not sensitive.
This work leaves several directions for future work. The
first is to test the off-path Coremelt attack with simulations,
extending these of [25] (and comparing to their results). A
second research direction is analyzing the security of the re-
maining three port randomization algorithms suggested in [19].
In particular, we believe that the fourth algorithm suggested
in [19], Random-Increments Port Selection, is likely to be
vulnerable to a variant of the attack we described in this paper.
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